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Entrepreneurship is commonly assumed to contribute to economic development (Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi 2005).  However, less is known about entrepreneurship in emerging markets and especially rural entrepreneurship in such contexts, including policy initiatives seeking to assist rural entrepreneurs, the nature, characteristics and outcomes of such initiatives, associated entrepreneurship difficulties and failure, and implications for regional development and governmental policy (McElwee 2006; Thoumrungroje 2010).  Targeted research and theory of such theoretically and practically significant issues is warranted because of insufficient knowledge of these matters (de Wolf et al. 2007), the importance of rural locations, the contribution of rural entrepreneurship to competitiveness (Grande et al. 2011), and the idiosyncratic traits of rural contexts, making general entrepreneurship theories potentially less applicable to the analysis of such matters (Colombo and Grilli 2010; Shucksmith and Rønningen 2011; Winterton and Warburton 2012).

In an attempt to contribute towards an understanding of the above issues, this manuscript researches a rural entrepreneurship initiative and associated difficulties and failure in an emerging market context – Thailand’s OTOP initiative, one of the biggest, longest-running and most significant rural entrepreneurship initiatives across emerging markets (Tongboonrawd and Sukpradit 2007; Sukasame et al. 2008; Thoumrungroje 2010).  OTOP is an acronym for ‘One Tambon One Product’, Tambon being a local administrative unit in Thailand (Kurokawa et al. 2010).  The OTOP initiative is based on the policy assumption that rural entrepreneurship, regional and local development can be triggered by producing and marketing a single product within each Tambon.  Although national governments have invested considerably in such programmes, one finds preconceptions about, rather than empirical evidence on, these initiatives in academic research (Gülümser et al. 2010).

Therefore, the following objectives are pursued: 
-RO1: to explore governmental policy towards rural entrepreneurship in an emerging market context; 
-RO2: to link the above to factors enabling or inhibiting rural entrepreneurship, with special reference to rural entrepreneurship difficulties and failure.  
In this manner, the research seeks to respond to recent calls for the need to empirically analyse and theorise entrepreneurship in emerging market locations (Bruton et al. 2008) and to expand theory on entrepreneurial difficulties and failure – a research domain which is scarce and requires exploration (Dimov and Shepherd 2005).

‘Entrepreneurship’ is defined as developing new ventures outside existing organisations, involving ‘risk-taking’, ‘innovation’ and a ‘proactive strategic emphasis’ (Kyriakopoulos et al. 2004; Parker 2011).  ‘Success’ is conceptualised in financial terms, as business development and growth (Colombo and Grilli 2010).  References to ‘failure’ emphasise ‘exit from entrepreneurship’ and insolvency or the cessation of operations (McKenzie 2008; Plehn-Dujowich 2010).  Though there is no universally preferred definition of ‘rural’/‘rurality’ in extant literature, the terms are used here to denote non-urban, non-metropolitan, less densely-populated areas which share certain qualitative traits in terms of physical remoteness, (lack of) access, cognitive and cultural distance, and general isolation (Sherval 2009).

The discussion opens with an overview of the relevant literature, focusing on factors enabling or inhibiting rural and emerging market entrepreneurship.  Gaps identified in extant scholarship inform the empirical research documented in subsequent sections.  Rural entrepreneurship in emerging market contexts is next theorised within a framework of rural entrepreneurial difficulties, failure, and associations with policy inadequacies, seeking to expand a growing scholarly agenda.

BACKGROUND
Although authorities introduce initiatives to support rural entrepreneurship in an attempt to address disadvantages in such locations (North and Smallbone 2006; Lafuente et al. 2007), less is known about rural entrepreneurship (Gülümser et al. 2010) as well as the nature and outcomes of such policy initiatives, and the links between these and entrepreneurship outcomes.  In the 1980s and 1990s only a handful of analysts contributed to knowledge of rural entrepreneurship, rural community, as well as rural entrepreneurship and development policy.  Flora and Flora (1993) identified skill shortages in rural community building and related challenges encompassing the lack of expertise.  Contemporaneous was Westhead and Wright’s (1999) emphasis on the importance of serial – what they termed ‘habitual’ – entrepreneurs in setting up ventures enhancing economic prospects of rural communities.  Policy makers were advised to involve such entrepreneurs in decision-making.

Relevant to this exploration is extant literature on factors inhibiting entrepreneurship in rural areas.  Success tends to be empirically studied and theorised in terms of the existence and abundance of resources and competencies (Jack and Anderson 2002; Courtney et al. 2008; Grande et al. 2011), while analyses seeking to uncover the obverse, including entrepreneurship difficulties and failure, are rarer (Dimov and Shepherd 2005; Cardon et al. 2009; Samuels et al. 2008).  Select few studies attribute difficulties to resource and competency inadequacies (McElwee and Robson 2005; McElwee 2006), and scholars continue to equate entrepreneurship failure with ‘exits’ only, an exception being McKenzie’s (2008) alternative conception.  A sole study by Driga et al. (2009) links policy initiatives to the ‘fear of failure’ among prospective rural entrepreneurs, though not in an emerging country context.  

Knowledge of emerging market contexts, rural locations, rural entrepreneurship policy initiatives in such contexts, and the assumptions underlying such initiatives is also limited, with publicly available research focused on Europe and North America (Kiss et al. 2012).  A handful of exceptions include the early work by Tambunan on rural entrepreneurship in Asia and forces impacting rural development (Tambunan 1995, 2000).  Rural entrepreneurship in less developed and emerging markets tends to be described as necessity-driven.  It is usually seen as a sign of rural poverty rather than development opportunities (Islam 1987; Tambunan 1995).  Tambunan’s (1995) empirical findings in rural settings in West Java support expectations of rural entrepreneurs being poor, with low education levels, and engaging in entrepreneurial activities to survive – drawing parallels to the ‘push’ literature on rural employment (White 1976).  

Although less is known about entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship policy in emerging market contexts, such locations and initiatives are important and distinct enough to require separate investigation and theory development, with findings from developed economies not always applicable to developing and emerging locations (Peng 2000; Bruton et al. 2008).  Specificities noted in extant research encompass dominant non-material motivations, complex and unfavourable environments, considerable institutional idiosyncrasies and ‘institutional voids’, and less optimally organised production and innovation structures.  All of the above may affect rural entrepreneurship, generating rural entrepreneurial dynamics distinct from those in Western contexts.

Of consequence to the line of argument and research objectives is extant research on policy instruments promoting entrepreneurship in peripheral and rural regions and their underlying assumptions about entrepreneurs’ behaviours.  Most publicly available research in this area is not focused on less developed and emerging economies as such, though, but evaluates policies in the developed world.  Exemplary are analyses of EU policies aimed at assisting and revitalising rural entrepreneurship in Europe’s peripheries (North and Smallbone 2006) and studies of associated rural entrepreneurial activity and level of entrepreneurship (Lafuente et al. 2007).  Academics have identified deficiencies of policy approaches, encompassing insufficient coordination and strategic approaches to building rural entrepreneurship capacity, tension among policies due to internal or external policy incoherence, ‘insensitivity’ to local circumstances, and top-down networking schemes allegedly based on assumptions about, rather than concrete knowledge on, local dynamics and motivations (North and Smallbone 2006).

Knowledge of Thai rural entrepreneurship, difficulties and failure is scarce, an exception being Khamanarong et al.’s (2009) short descriptive study of rural entrepreneurship resilience.  As regards the crucial distinction between necessity- and opportunity-driven entrepreneurs, the GEM report on Thailand (Akrathit et al. 2014) is noteworthy.  In spite of positives such as high overall entrepreneurship rates in Thailand and increasing opportunity perceptions among the Thai population, significant proportion of entrepreneurial activity is shown to be necessity driven, especially in the areas empirically studied and reported in this paper.  The report compares Thailand to nine ASEAN and East Asian countries, with separate data on several Thai regions made available.  Significantly higher are rates of Thai business discontinuance, compared to other ASEAN economies.  Thailand features prominently across areas of ‘fear of failure’, scarcity of innovation and the introduction of new products, and negative perceptions of institutional impediments – setting the country apart from its neighbours.

The above GEM findings are generally comparable to conclusions drawn in the national innovation systems (NIS) literature on Thailand, especially Chaminade et al.’s (2013) findings of negative features of the Thai NIS (inadequate research and innovation, poor engineering and design capabilities especially among SMEs, weak linkages among users, producers and universities) and major ‘systemic’ problems of this NIS (institutions, networks, science and technology infrastructure, and support services).  In spite of the generally positive influence of Thaksin’s administration on Thailand’s NSI in recent years, Chaminade et al. (2013) describe the above systemic problems as intractable.

Though less appropriate due to their focus on SMEs, the brief empirical reports by Na Sakolnakom (2010) and Limlawan (2011) uncover evidence of considerable resource deficiencies in Thailand, therefore providing indirect support for the applicability of necessity-opportunity entrepreneurship concepts (Wennekers et al. 2005; Valliere and Peterson 2009; Williams and Williams 2012) to the Thai context.  It is anticipated that necessity entrepreneurship may be more pronounced in the context studied here, not the least due to, first, the emphasis within OTOP on rural, disadvantaged locations and groups with few means of securing alternative employment, and second, the association uncovered by Bergmann and Sternberg (2007) between such entrepreneurship and higher unemployment rates, which is the case in the studied Thai rural locations (IMF 2013).  Necessity entrepreneurship is often portrayed as a ‘last resort’ activity, with individuals starting a business due to non-existent or unsatisfactory alternative opportunities (Minniti et al. 2005).  Necessity entrepreneurs share neither the preparedness nor the higher aspirations or search for independence of opportunity entrepreneurs.  Rather, they are described as reactive and driven by unfavourable economic conditions (Bergmann and Sternberg 2007).  Such traits may affect rural entrepreneurship and its outcomes, including difficulties and failure, in the studied context.

EMPIRICAL SETTING, DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
Research setting: Thai entrepreneurship, the OTOP initiative and the Thai context
Governmental initiatives encouraging entrepreneurship have proliferated in Thailand in the past few decades (Sukasame et al. 2008; Thoumrungroje 2010).  Thai authorities have initiated programmes for business incubation across high- and low-technology sectors (Sukasame et al. 2008).  The Department of Industrial Promotion, the Office of Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion, and the National Innovation Agency act as entrepreneurship facilitators.  It is through such concerted efforts that Thai entrepreneurship has come to being ranked highly by Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2005).

One such initiative, the ‘One Tambon One Product’ (OTOP), was introduced by the Thai Rak Thai administration in 2001 as part of national economic restructuring.  Inspired by the success of OVOP in Japan initiated in 1979, OTOP’s aim is to support high-quality, value-added, agricultural and artisanal entrepreneurship in rural areas of Thailand especially in peripheral, underdeveloped areas in the North and North East which have suffered from unemployment and deprivation (Noknoi et al. 2012).  OTOP has attracted over 80,000 participants since its inception.  Successful OTOP entrepreneurs have their products certified, and the growth of their enterprises is assisted by public-sector bodies (Tumcharoen 2012).  Product categories eligible for incorporation in OTOP include foods, beverages, textiles, household items, traditional handicrafts, souvenirs, and herbal products (Kurokawa 2010).  One product from each Tambon is selected as the Tambon’s ‘starred OTOP product’, and specific entrepreneurs’ offerings are graded from 1* to 5* against criteria of quality, export potential, sustainability, rural development, and customer satisfaction (Kurokawa et al. 2010).

OTOP objectives include job creation, raising rural income levels, strengthening rural self-reliance, promoting traditional Thai values, fostering human resource development in rural areas, and encouraging product development, branding and marketing (Otop5star 2013; Routray 2007; Tongboonrawd and Sukpradit 2007).  By adopting an inclusive view of (economic, socio-cultural, environmental) sustainability and seeking to strengthen local community, OTOP shares the strategic vision of similar programmes (Kurokawa et al. 2010).  With OTOP objectives comparable to those of similar initiatives, certain theoretical generalisability is possible.

A number of public-sector authorities are involved in planning, promoting and supporting OTOP (Otop5star 2013; VoV 2013).  The Division of Community Development (DCD) provides advice in areas of quality control, product development, and training.  The Product Development Centre is a national agency consulting OTOP entrepreneurs regarding product design and packaging (Routray 2007), while the OTOP National Administrative Committee and the Ministry of Interior offer financial guidance (Kurokawa et al. 2010).  Agencies organise and promote so-called ‘OTOP fairs’ which have been shown to raise rural incomes, unite villages, and rescue dormant or disappearing rural knowledge.

OTOP has been praised for alleviating rural poverty, though extensive pockets of rural poverty especially in areas targeted by OTOP such as the North remain obvious (Figure 1).  Annual sales figures for OTOP products have steadily increased, from 10bn baht in 2002 to 40bn in 2004, and were expected to reach 100bn baht by the end of 2014 (NationMultimedia 2013).  Sales output of OTOP products has increased 4.6 times during the 2002-2008 period alone (Natsuda et al. 2011).  This success has attracted the attention of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) members, describing OTOP as ‘a good model’ for rural development (APEC 2003).  OTOP contributes 2% of GDP increase in rural areas of Thailand, provides 6% of employment opportunities in one rural area alone, and in spite of occasional criticisms (Tangpianpant 2010), has been shown to positively impact rural entrepreneurship (Takei 2007; Kurokawa et al. 2010).

‘Insert Figure 1 here’

The initiative reflects certain specificities of Thailand’s socio-economic, political, institutional, and historical-cultural context.  OTOP was cancelled following the overthrow of Thaksin Shinawatra’s administration by the military junta in 2006, only to be re-introduced more recently.  It is regarded as the centrepiece of Thaksin’s economic policies promoting demand-driven economic recovery from the 1997 Asian economic crisis and economic development more favourable to Thailand’s rural majority as part of an allegedly Keynesian economic approach (Shari 2003).  Controversies surrounding OTOP in 2006 were implicated in wider political-ideological struggles, with accusations of corruption and authoritarian governance by Shinawatra.  Political power subsequently returned to traditional ruling elites within a governance framework described as authoritarian and consistent with developments in modern Thai history encompassing military coups, dictatorial governance, dominance of corrupt business interests, social unrest, defective civilian rule, rudimentary civil and inequitable development (Figure 1) which OTOP sought to reverse (Bünte and Ufen 2009; Heiduk 2011).  It is against this backdrop that Taksin’s policies need to be studied, including OTOP which combines contradictory elements of paternalism and enablement, liberalism and illiberalism.

Data collection
Inductive, exploratory research was organised in three stages in 2012-2014 (Corbin and Strauss 2008).  Considering the complexity of the research topic and the lack of clear expectations or hypotheses, the aim was to develop an understanding of the experiences and perceptions of key OTOP stakeholders, while avoiding abstract generalisations.  This emphasis on collecting and analysing subjective viewpoints and experiences necessitated the adoption of a multi-actor approach, an interpretivist design and qualitative data collection methods (Alvesson and Deetz 2000; Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008).  Entrepreneurs represented an appropriate unit of analysis.

Eighty-one semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with OTOP entrepreneurs, their spouses, public-sector managers, advisors, analysts and academics familiar with the initiative.  Interviews were of the ‘interview guide’ type – appropriate for collecting and making sense of experiences, perceptions and viewpoints (Holliday 2007).  A mix of quota and snowball sampling was utilised.  The population was segmented into mutually exclusive categories of ‘successful’, ‘facing difficulties’ and ‘failed’ rural entrepreneurship, where such data were made available.  Roughly equal proportions were used to select and contact potential interviewees from each of the above categories.  Sixty entrepreneurs were contacted, with fifty-five agreeing to participate.  Twenty-six additional interviewees comprised eight spouses, seven advisors, four public-sector managers, and seven analysts and academics familiar with OTOP and rural entrepreneurship.  The final sample is far above the high end of Yin’s (1994) recommendation for qualitative research sampling.  It approximates sample sizes in some quantitative studies in entrepreneurship research, while preserving flexibility and depth of understanding associated with qualitative inquiry.  It is also a balanced sample by, first, representing all major OTOP constituencies, and second, capturing equally the mutually exclusive categories of ‘successful’, ‘facing difficulties’ and ‘failed’ rural entrepreneurship (Table 1).  Although information on the demographics of OTOP entrepreneurs is unavailable in the public domain, the sample is relatively representative of the OTOP population​[1]​: median age of 51 (against 48 in our sample), 25% primary school-educated (against 29%), above 87% married (compared to 90%), and with average 5-10 years of entrepreneurial experience.

‘Insert Table 1 here’

Questions and topics incorporated within interview guides operationalised the earlier mentioned research objectives, though interviewees were allowed to alter the course of interviews by sharing unanticipated viewpoints and experiences.  Different ‘interview guides’ were prepared for, first, rural entrepreneurs and other rural stakeholders such as their spouses, and second, public-sector managers, advisors, analysts, and academics.

Questions explored with entrepreneurs and other rural stakeholders encompassed:
-	their views about their own and others’ performance, the performance of OTOP, factors inhibiting or enabling their venture or OTOP in general;
-	perceptions and experiences with obstacles to growth of their or other OTOP businesses, and actions taken to address such weaknesses;
-	perceptions and experiences with failure as part of OTOP, and ways of overcoming failure;
-	experiences with institutions and policy initiatives facilitating OTOP.

Interviews with public-sector managers, advisors, analysts and academics covered some of the above questions, but these constituencies were also invited to comment and reflect on:
-	the OTOP initiative more generally, its impact on rural entrepreneurship, its success and weaknesses compared to similar initiatives;
-	OTOP’s evolution and achievements in the past decade, failure, difficulties and measures taken to address them;
-	their personal experiences with OTOP.

Interviews lasted 47 minutes on average (maximum 91 minutes), were recorded, transcribed and verified for mistakes (Creswell 2009).  The initial twelve interviews in 2012 were face to face, and were collected and translated by a Thai research associate.  During the third phase of data collection in 2013-2014, such local research help was not available.  Therefore, some interviews were conducted over Skype or over the phone, to minimise sampling bias by interviewing respondents irrespective of their possession of Internet access and a Skype account.  

Data analysis
Thematic analysis and coding conventions were applied (Creswell 2009; Guest 2012), with coding referring to attaching keywords to interview text segments which vary from a couple of words to entire paragraphs (Saldana 2009).  Coding was followed by categorisation whereby codes and other textual statements were conceptualised (Guest 2012).  Of fifteen second-order codes, six were ‘dominant’ – they explained ninety-five percent of interview texts (Table 2), with each code appearing at least ten times in an interview.  Three dominant codes (codes 1-3) were derived from extant literature, while codes 4-6 emerged during data collection and analysis.  A complete list of dominant codes, their sources in the literature and in interviews, with representative supporting quotes, is found in Table 2.  

The six dominant codes are:
-	‘Resources as critical factors enabling or inhibiting rural entrepreneurship’ (code 1) (‘money, people, machines, they are all important to us, to our business’);
-	‘Resource weaknesses as sources of rural entrepreneurship difficulties’ (code 2) (‘the problem is funds.  I don’t have enough money to produce more and new products.  Improving the packaging of my existing products has already cost me a lot’);
-	‘Not meeting expectations and goals as a major definition of rural entrepreneurship failure’ (code 3) (‘I’m not succeeding in meeting any of the [OTOP] expectations. …I’m failing’);
-	‘Links among failure, difficulties, and OTOP policy nature’ (code 4) (‘We had no information and guidance [on the part of] government divisions. …So what can you do to achieve as OTOP expects you to’);
-	‘Passivity of OTOP entrepreneurs as a key source of rural entrepreneurship failure’ (code 5) (‘they [many entrepreneurs] just don’t do enough… [but] sit and wait’);
-	‘Entrepreneurs’ over-reliance upon public-sector guidance as a key source of rural entrepreneurship failure’ (code 6) (‘‘why they [OTOP entrepreneurs] fail?  Because they think ‘the government will take care of us…will teach us and we’ll survive’’’).
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The three analysis stages of coding, categorisation of codes, and derivation of themes were carried out over a number of iterations, to refine analysis and findings (Saldana 2009; Guest 2012).  The simultaneous engagement with data and theoretical concepts provided opportunities to alter the contents of interview guides by probing further into issues that had emerged during earlier interviews (Layder 2005; Corbin and Strauss 2008).  Therefore, principles of ‘constant comparative’ and ‘convergent’ analysis were applied, whereby data collected during interviews were used to refine subsequent interviews (Carson et al. 2001).  Analysis reached a ‘saturation’/‘convergence’ point when no new information was uncovered (Bowen 2008) after around fifty interviews.

Interviews have been anonymised; findings and interview quotes are presented with fictitious, randomly assigned names.  The rating of the entrepreneur’s product(s) (from 1* to 5*) accompanies quotes from interviews​[2]​.  

FINDINGS
The earlier mentioned dominant codes have been conceptualised into four main themes theorised within Thai socio-economic and historical-institutional contexts:
-	Theme 1: Resource deficiencies are a major factor for rural entrepreneurship difficulties but not rural entrepreneurship failure – derived from dominant codes 1 and 2; 
-	Theme 2: Entrepreneurs’ passivity and risk-aversion are key sources of rural entrepreneurship failure (derived from dominant codes 5 and 6);
-	Theme 3: The main expression of failure is not entrepreneurial exit/venture bankruptcy but entrepreneurs’ inability to meet policy expectations and initiative objectives – derived from dominant code 3; 
-	Theme 4: Rural entrepreneurship difficulties and failure are strongly associated with institutional contexts, governmental policy, and rural and regional development – derived from dominant codes 3-5.

Interview Theme 1: Resource deficiencies are a major factor for rural entrepreneurship difficulties but not rural entrepreneurship failure
In extant research, resource absence or deficiencies in areas of human capital, management skills, marketing know-how, and business intelligence influence entrepreneurship difficulties (Rothearmel et al. 2007; Steven and Combs 2008).  Limitations in accessing or utilising physical and financial resources have been shown to be critical to survival and, therefore by extension, failure (Dinis 2006; Harris et al. 2005; Khamanarong et al. 2009).  Perceptions of this centrality of resource and competency deficiencies to rural entrepreneurship difficulties dominate fifty (62%) interviews, being particularly pronounced among entrepreneurs (75% of interviews with this constituency).  However, resource-related factors only partially inhibit rural entrepreneurship, for their effect on ‘failure’ has been found to be considerably weaker and less direct than the impact on ‘difficulties’.  In only a handful of narrated instances do resource problems fuel failure by aggravating entrepreneurship difficulties, suggesting that resources and competencies do not play the universally momentous role ascribed to them.  Analysis of their impact should be fine-tuned by distinguishing the separate effects that they seem to have on ‘difficulties’ and ‘failure’.

Resource-driven difficulties are habitually attributed to physical capital limitations, lack of finance, and difficulties in accessing funding (dominating 56%, 53% and 48% of all narratives, respectively).  Resource impediments mark the interview with Amporn, a 3* entrepreneur with a thirteen-year-old herbal-products business.  In spite of her long affiliation with OTOP, Amporn had ‘experienced many difficulties in running [the] business’.  Coming from a humble background and not being well educated, Amporn narrates stories about unsuccessful negotiations with lenders, lack of financial support from elsewhere (including the public sector), difficulties in buying and upgrading machinery, ‘suspicion’ and ‘opposition from family [members]’ to her business plans.  Her descriptions of resource availability and its effect on the business encompass various references to ‘hindrances’ and ‘obstacles’.  Similarly, Kwanjai B., a 2* OTOP entrepreneur and the founder of a pineapple-biscuits business, claims:
‘I have these pineapple biscuits as my core product, but not everyone likes pineapples…the problem is funds.  I don’t have enough money to produce more and new products.  Improving the packaging of my existing products has already cost me a lot’.

Additional resource-related sources of impediments encompass human and relationship capital inadequacies.  Entrepreneurs’ knowledge and skill deficiencies account for certain difficulties (dominating 51% of entrepreneurs’ accounts), with only a minority of interviewees (20%) attributing failure to such deficiencies – confirming the distinctness of ‘difficulty’ and ‘failure’ constructs and the need to analyse and conceptualise them separately.  Links between such deficits and difficulties figure prominently across interviews with Pongtep M. (3*), Itthipol (2*), Pongtep C. (4*) and seventeen other entrepreneurs, irrespective of venture type, star rating, age and size.  Pongtep M. and Itthipol attribute venture obstacles to the ‘lack of good people’.  Comments such as ‘It’s a big problem…you have simple people here, with no education and knowledge [to run a] business, you cannot expect much of them’ and ‘We’re all the same here, with similar problems…I have little experience handling money and running a business…[in] dealing with people’ capture the gravity and extent of human capital obstacles exacerbated by insufficient time for training​[3]​ and the scarcity of training opportunities across the studied locations.

Interview Theme 2: Entrepreneurs’ passivity and risk-aversion are key sources of rural entrepreneurship failure
While the above noted impact of resources (Theme 1) is mostly direct with respect to rural entrepreneurship difficulties and indirect regarding failure, the effect of attitudinal inhibitors on the ‘difficulties’ and ‘failure’ constructs is more complex.  Furthermore, in certain instances attitudinal inhibitors operate in conjunction with and through resource deficiencies (for instance, by entrepreneurs not proactively seeking to secure and upgrade resources or address resource deficiencies).  OTOP entrepreneurs’ risk aversion, their cautious approach to growth, and inadequate initiative-taking dominate entire narratives on failure.  Buncha, a 4* OTOP entrepreneur with management education, is among the narrators most frequently making references to ‘failure’/‘fail’/‘shame’/‘shameful results’.  He appears indecisive when discussing decision-making in his company and admits being averse to taking various risks, including financial risk.  Buncha explains this aversion with his ‘fear…[of]…having debts…I’ve worked hard to get where I am’.  Though allegedly ‘determined to succeed [and never be]…poor again’, a 2* entrepreneur narrates his ‘failure to do what I had planned [initially]’, linking this ‘failure’ to three instances during the two years preceding the interview when he had declined business propositions for expansion and growth.

Narratives demonstrate interviewed entrepreneurs’ awareness of the capacity of entrepreneurship to help improve the situation of poor sections in less developed societies (Naudé 2009) and enable constituencies to stabilise or even increase their income and accumulate assets (Hall et al. 2010; Seelos and Mair 2005).  These are, however, accompanied by a heightened fear of risk and failure.  Against the backdrop of institutional voids, policy and governance impediments – discussed later in this section – entrepreneurial strategies tend to reflect an emphasis on risk-avoidance rather than risk-taking, risk-coping or risk-transfer.  This fear of failure and risk informs the observed cautious approach to venture management and growth, innovation, or the introduction of new and differentiated products – confirming recent conclusions drawn in Akrathit et al.’s (2014) GEM report.

Interviewed public-sector managers, analysts, and academics describe OTOP entrepreneurs as ‘averse to change’, ‘too cautious’, ‘not bold enough’ and ‘forego[ing] business expansion…even when conditions favour such an expansion’.  Eight out of eleven interviewed public-sector managers, analysts and academics attribute failure solely to such cautious attitudes – a view shared by some entrepreneurs’ spouses.  Lavan, the spouse of a 2* entrepreneur in business for 9 years, notes that both of them had been resistant to the mere mention of business expansion: ‘[we] have never thought of expanding…at all...normally [we] get over 30,000 baht a week.  This is enough for us, because we don’t have any children to take care of…but then we have not achieved the goals set’.  

A second sub-set of attitudinal impediments and sources of failure concerns the alleged over-reliance of many OTOP entrepreneurs on public-sector advice regarding business growth, developing relations, general management, marketing, and training.  Therefore, though entrepreneurs appear cautious, many are also portrayed as overly eager to rely on the public sector when seeking to address earlier mentioned deficiencies and obstacles.  Public-sector agencies and OTOP bodies are commonly described by entrepreneurs as their ‘most important’ or ‘only’ (49% and 36%) sponsor, ‘preferred’ or ‘sole’ (49% and 42%) source of advice.

Findings of attitudinal problems rather than resource deficiencies impacting failure are rather unusual, disconfirming conclusions drawn by Dakoumi Hamrouni and Akkari (2012) and Dimov and Shepherd (2005) who attribute failure to resource shortages (‘management skills, ‘shortage of financial resources’, ‘general human capital’).  Narratives do not completely negate the effect of resource constraints on failure; rather they reveal, first, that resource constraints may at times be informed by deeper-seated attitudinal problems, and second, that attitudinal problems could directly impact failure without the moderating role of resource constraints.

Interview Theme 3: The main expression of failure is not entrepreneurial exit/venture bankruptcy but entrepreneurs’ inability to meet policy expectations and initiative objectives
A wider set of manifestations of failure were empirically uncovered than commonly theorised in extant literature where failure tends to be viewed negatively as something to be avoided (McKenzie 2008).  There is a tendency to define failure in terms of exits (Shepherd 2003; Samuels et al. 2008) and ‘shutting down, discontinuing or quitting a business’ (Hessels et al. 2011, 447) only.  Insiders’ stories (emic perspectives) allude to a richer understanding of failure extending beyond bankruptcy and encompassing, among others, one’s inability to meet project goals.  Entrepreneurs’ inability to accomplish OTOP goals or to balance social/familial/business aims is frequently labelled as ‘failure’ (above 50% of narratives about failure), with a minority (20%) of stories defining failure as ‘exit’/‘liquidation’.  Telling are the accounts of fish-crisp-business owner Nopadol (2* entrepreneur) who sees his venture as ‘tarnished’, ‘damaged’ and ‘failed’ because of negative appraisals by OTOP assessors.  Though he partly attributes such ‘failure’ to difficulties in ‘access[ing] partners and expand[ing] relationships’, Nopadol’s failed plans to expand generate ‘frustration that we are not going anywhere.  I’m not succeeding in meeting any…[OTOP] expectations…I feel I’m failing’.  Vijittra’s experience with the steamed-palm-products family business (2*) centres on ‘failing’, ‘lack of success’ and ‘letting others down’.  The business was still functioning at the time of the interview and was therefore not ‘failing’ in the conventional sense; however, Vijittra notes ‘fail[ure] to realise plans’, attributing this to ‘difficulties in sourcing local staff. …I’m tired of training all newcomers…they would get drunk often after work, and would not work properly the next day’.

Interview Theme 4: Rural entrepreneurship difficulties and failure are strongly associated with institutional contexts, governmental policy, rural and regional development
Unlike the OVOP programme in Japan which encourages direct public-sector advice, operational and financial involvement in OVOP businesses through joint ventures and direct investments, Thai authorities rarely support OTOP entrepreneurs directly through the provision of physical, financial, human and other capital (Routray 2007; Khamanarong et al. 2009).  Occasional financial assistance assumes the format of micro grants for buying small pieces of machinery or for organising free product packaging for a limited trial period only.  The scarcity and modest nature of such assistance may explain entrepreneurs’ attributions of difficulties and failure to ‘governmental apathy’, ‘little support we receive’ and ‘the blind eye they all [public-policy officials] turn on us’ (71% of entrepreneurs’ and spouses’ narratives).  Such perceptions are not unique to OTOP (see Meccheri and Pelloni 2006).  However, what distinguishes OTOP is the magnitude of such impediments ‘debilitat[ing] my business [and]…prevent[ing] me from satisfying the demands of…OTOP bosses’ (Kampol, a 4* entrepreneur).  This is reflected in narratives informing of livelihood strategies seemingly revolving around necessity-driven activities and addressing external factors perceived to be generally unfavourable – confirming Akrathit et al.’s (2014) findings of perceptions of high institutional impediments.  Outbursts of interviewed entrepreneurs ‘really want[ing] to quit doing this [OTOP participation] but I still need to collect some money before I get retired’ (Chutima, a 2* entrepreneur) are contrasted by an interviewed academic with OVOP conditions where public sector and local communities ‘assist…struggling new and small rural ventures’ (see also Kurokawa 2010).

Apart from establishing the initiative, various public-sector bodies are mentioned regarding the assistance that they provide in areas of training, branding, marketing advice, education, and website design, among others.  However, assistance is described as ‘inadequate’, ‘wrong’, ‘inconsistent’, ‘hav[ing] little impact on my business’, and ‘doing little to help me or others like me avoid…complications’.  Advice has allegedly ‘done little’ to ‘reverse the fortunes of many ventures…that didn’t do very well…[with entrepreneurs] often giving up’.  Institutional conditions and lack of assistance are habitually described by entrepreneurs as contributors to ‘difficulties’ and ‘failure’, both in the sense of ‘exit’ and ‘failure to meet OTOP objectives’.  Associations among policy-making, ‘difficulty’, ‘failure’ and rural development are multifaceted.  While entrepreneurs view such associations sometimes negatively, attributing difficulty or failure to policy inaction, all but one interviewed public-sector managers, analysts, and academics portray OTOP entrepreneurs as ‘overly reliant’/‘too reliant’ upon public-sector advice and direct support (‘[e]xpectations [from us] are too high’, ‘entrepreneurs…want us to help them always [emphasis added]’).

DISCUSSION
Findings are incorporated in a framework of policy rural entrepreneurship intervention, rural entrepreneurship difficulties and failure (Figure 2).  OTOP entrepreneurs tend to oversee all aspects of their businesses.  Permanent staff and seasonal workers are rarely employed, and only five interviewees mention hiring additional labour.  Capital inadequacies and relationship-building weaknesses are viewed as principal impediments (construct of ‘difficulties’) to rural entrepreneurship but did not appear to be major sources of failure (Figure 2; Area A).  Such impediments are exacerbated by risk aversion and inadequate initiative-taking of entrepreneurs failing to take advantage of opportunities to develop their human capital, relationship resources, and knowledge across areas of finance, branding, and product development (Figure 2; Areas B and D) and exhibiting few if any of the traits of successful entrepreneurs discussed by McElwee (2006) including locus of control and initiative taking.  This prevailing view among interviewees of the role of resource and competency deficiencies as primary drivers of difficulties confirms past findings regarding Thailand (Tongboonrawd and Sukpradit 2007; Khammanarong et al. 2009) while their weakened, less direct effect on both manifestations of failure is unanticipated.

‘Insert Figure 2 here’

Complex and nuanced are findings of attitudinal impediments and their associations with ‘difficulty’ and ‘failure’.  Such impediments include insufficient risk-taking and initiative-taking, a cautious approach to growth, and over-reliance on external advice and guidance.  They appear to be significant explanatory factors of both ‘difficulty’ and ‘failure’ – less often reported in extant literature but central to the framework (Area B) by highlighting potentially significant traits of rural entrepreneurship in emerging settings.  Though such issues have been anticipated by a minority of scholars (Dinis 2006), empirical evidence had not been furnished so far, in order to advance theory.  It is indicative that only four interviewed entrepreneurs responded to the authors’ request to provide specific examples of risk-taking, defined to interviewees in terms of, first, making substantial investments which have uncertain and risky outcomes, or second, introducing new and differentiated, non-generic products.  A single instance is narrated of an entrepreneur who had taken on considerable risk, facing the threat of bankruptcy.  These findings empirically confirm more general findings of the uncertainty-avoidance of South-East Asian entrepreneurs, encompassing lesser growth orientation and weaker risk-proneness (Hiemstra et al. 2006; Galloway et al. 2011) as well as entrepreneurial weaknesses presented by North and Smallbone (2006) encompassing conservative outlook, risk aversion, low levels of education, and limited life experiences.  Furthermore, entrepreneurs within initiatives such as OTOP may share an expectation of dependence on public sector and governmental guidance.

Resource and attitudinal impediments are intertwined with the specifics of the studied policy initiative and are affected by more general socio-economic, political, institutional and historical circumstances (Figure A; Areas E and F).  Long-standing rural exploitation, marginalisation, under-development and peripherality are reflected in findings in Figure 2 (Areas A and B); sense-making of such findings should be contextualised in 20th century Thai industrialisation policies generating urban-rural inequalities (Kuhonta 2003).  Equally debilitating to rural entrepreneurship seems to be the influence of authoritarian elites and urban business interests which continue to implement top-down policy approaches that are insensitive to local (rural, regional) circumstances and needs.  Though aimed at reversing long-standing institutional and contextual inhibitors (Figure 2; Area E), authoritarian tendencies have proved to be resilient (Poopongpan 2007), including in terms of the inability of OTOP to be conducive to the creation of an environment enabling free and creative independent thinking, initiative, or risk-taking.  OTOP-related inhibitors complement and reflect more general institutional and contextual impediments, including authoritarian governance and top-down approaches to political, social and economic management still dominant across spheres of political-economic activity in the country.  In spite of OTOP’s aim to enable rural areas and empower their inhabitants, the paternalism and deficient liberalism marking this initiative seem to burden – rather than support – rural entrepreneurs, fuelling policy impediments (Figure 2; Area C) and exacerbating earlier discussed attitudinal deficiencies (Figure 2; Area B).  Compared with similar programmes, OTOP is distinctly more state-driven and is rather centralist by adopting a top-down approach to management that may not facilitate initiative-taking at lower level of organisation (Natsuda et al. 2011) – empirically confirming North and Smallbone’s (2006) conclusion, though in a different context, that top-down rural entrepreneurship policies may exhibit ‘insensitivity’ to local circumstances, tend to be based on assumptions about local dynamics and motivations rather than empirical evidence, and could be less successful than bottom-up approaches.  The result could be that, rather than nurturing entrepreneurs by promoting their self-reliance, responsibility and creativity, the initiative sustains a culture of dependency engrained in the North and other rural areas where OTOP is particularly active.  Although in its current, post-2006 format the initiative allegedly promotes self-sufficiency, heavy reliance on governmental support continues to feature as its key attribute to this day.

CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, FURTHER RESEARCH
This empirical research studied difficulties and failure – less frequently prioritised issues which have recently been singled out as requiring consideration (Dimov and Shepherd 2005; Samuels et al. 2008; Cardon et al. 2009).  Identified impediments to rural entrepreneurship in emerging markets included the more commonly studied resource- and competency-related inadequacies along with less tangible, attitudinal sources of failure and institutional hindrances requiring more systematic analysis and theorisation.  Entrepreneurship failure has been shown to be linked not only to venture exit but also to non-attainment of venture objectives and initiative aims.  

Conceptual contributions include, first, studying rural entrepreneurship in an emerging market context; second, documenting and theorising rural entrepreneurship failure and attitudinal problems as significant drivers of such failure; and third, suggesting diverse manifestations of failure as unique constructs with dissimilar sources, processes and consequences.  Findings underlie a framework tracing multifaceted linkages among policy traits and associated inhibiting circumstances, and rural entrepreneurship.  This research extends growing scholarship of rural entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship in emerging markets, first, by building upon McElwee’s (2006) and Bruton et al.’s (2008) calls for a corrective to the focus on European, North American and other developed contexts, and second, by providing of a fuller understanding of failure and related constructs through their proper contextualisation in policy and other institutional circumstances, and path-dependent conditions.  Last but not least, although based on a small sample and focused on one initiative only –shortcomings that are critically assessed towards the end of this line of argument – the research adds to the scant yet growing entrepreneurship literature on reactive attitudes as well as the nature and consequences of constrained entrepreneurial environments especially in developing and emerging market contexts.  

Managerial and policy implications centre on the above noted sets of rural entrepreneurship inhibitors harnessed in the production of a multi-stakeholder framework for designing political initiatives to encourage entrepreneurship in rural areas of developing countries by respecting the attitudinal characteristics of local entrepreneurs (see Figure 3).  Extant literature suggests that initiatives as the one studied here may be successful and effective only if designed and implemented in a coordinated and strategic manner and if exhibiting a ‘clearer vision’ about the role of rural entrepreneurship (North and Smallbone 2006).  Empirical findings from this research demonstrate, though, that the above need to be complemented with an intervention approach that is, first, sensitive to local needs and the behavioural characteristics of recipients, and second, founded upon a policy philosophy cognizant of the need for local involvement across stages of policy and initiative formation and implementation.  Only by respecting such policy fundamentals may an initiative such as OTOP achieve significant objectives of building entrepreneurial capacity, including by successfully managing and influencing entrepreneurs’ and potential entrepreneurs’ motivations and attitudes.  Policy success is also shown to be possible only when earlier mentioned tensions among policies are avoided.

‘Insert Figure 3 here’

Weaknesses across the areas highlighted in Figure 3 may help explain some of the OTOP outcomes that were uncovered during the empirical research, as less sufficiently investigated drivers of entrepreneurial difficulties and failure across areas of entrepreneurial mindsets and attitudes such as the reported (negative and dismissive) rural entrepreneurs’ attitudes to training and educational initiatives, their inadequate acceptance of and participation in resource development schemes which appear to present particular challenges to Thai development agencies.  With low to absent sensitivity to local / rural and entrepreneurial needs and with no local involvement in OTOP formation and implementation, the findings regarding the upgrading of skills, knowledge and other local resources being viewed with suspicion or disapproval within such communities should be less surprising.  

The recommended recipient sensitivity, clarity of vision, and local involvement may ultimately rest on the ability of political initiatives seeking to encourage entrepreneurship in rural areas of developing countries to harness the already existing, underutilised potential of the ‘animators’ (North and Smallbone 2006).  In the context of OTOP and Thailand, these were shown to be local rural entrepreneurs involved with multiple ventures, acting as role models potentially capable of influencing (potential) rural entrepreneurs’ cognitive expectations, motivations and behaviours, including in terms of the ability to identify opportunities and willingness to start and grow new rural ventures.  The low involvement of such role models in OTOP policy formulation and implementation could be avoided in future initiatives.  This may assist the promotion of rural entrepreneurial cultures in peripheral locations and the development of positive attitudes among locals towards the very notion and workings of entrepreneurship.  Successful policy approaches may also need to involve additional constituencies – individuals with persuasive capabilities, or ‘cultural entrepreneurs’, due to their legitimacy among rural constituencies – potentially enhancing opportunities to mediate entrepreneurial and other rural resources.  The capacity of such entrepreneurs to affect rural attitudes and to mould individual and collective behaviours as those highlighted in earlier sections, though, has not been empirically tested or trialled within initiatives such as OTOP.

Further policy-relevant implications relate to the evolutionary nature of the studied developments.  The current situation in rural Thailand illustrates the considerable lag between introducing an instrument and detecting desirable outcomes.  Individuals involved in such initiatives are expected to unlearn socially acceptable behaviours and learn new ones which may clash with inherited cultural, political and social conventions.  Earlier commented national history and entrepreneurial inheritance in the researched regions shape the effectiveness of policy interventions.  In that sense, OTOP findings, first, demonstrate the ‘stickiness’ and overly path-dependent nature of entrepreneurial outcomes.  They should be fully understood and even anticipated by policy-makers charged with assisting rural development and entrepreneurship in emerging contexts where tangible benefits – as the Thai example demonstrates – in the sense of success levels of new ventures, raising income levels and reducing inequalities may not materialise in the short term.

Perceptions and voices of a relatively limited sample, from a few locations in one emerging economy only, have been presented and theorised.  Our aim was not statistical generalisability, but to draw the outlines of a framework which requires further conceptualisation and empirical testing.  Therefore, caution should be exercised when assessing this case study which may differ from other types of rural entrepreneurship found elsewhere in emerging contexts, including in urban and metropolitan centres of Thailand.  Specificities of the initiative, including its promotion by Thai authorities and its top-down hierarchical structure, may set it apart from approaches elsewhere in the developing world.  Nonetheless, it would be misleading to infer that generalising from this case study may be problematic or that it cannot contribute to theory development (Flyvbjerg 2006).  Particular case studies as the one presented here not only provide closeness and richness of context-sensitive knowledge (Flyvbjerg 2001) but, due to their specificity, reveal significant information which is not necessarily available by analysing more representative cases (Mills et al. 2010).
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Figure 1. Poverty Headcount Ratio and Distribution by Province, Thailand 1988, 1994, and 2002
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^1	  Compared to Kader et al.’s (2009) readings.
^2	  1* (1-star) denotes the lowest-rated OTOP products, while the most promising are graded as 5* (5-star).
^3	  Even when training opportunities in areas of marketing, promotion, matching buyers and producers, business management, entrepreneurship development, and bookkeeping are provided, they are rarely attended.
